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Viswanathan: Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy

TAX COMPLIANCE IN A DECENTRALIZING
ECONOMY
Manoj Viswanathan*
ABSTRACT
Tax compliance in the United States has long relied on information
from centralized intermediaries—the financial institutions,
employers, and brokers that help ensure income is reported and taxes
are paid. Yet while the IRS remains tied to these centralized entities,
consumers and businesses are not. New technologies, such as sharing
economy platforms (companies such as Airbnb, Uber, and Instacart)
and the blockchain (the platform on which various cryptocurrencies
are based) are providing new, decentralized options for exchanging
goods and services. Without legislative and agency intervention,
these technologies pose a critical threat to the reporting system
underlying domestic and international tax compliance.
Until now, legal academia has paid scant attention to the extent to
which U.S. tax compliance relies on centralized intermediaries as
information reporters. Prior scholarship has instead focused on
describing existing information reporting protocols and the
characteristics of successful reporters. This Article moves further,
demonstrating that both domestic and international tax compliance
cannot function without these centralized intermediaries. Next, the
Article argues that the potential decentralization caused by new
technologies should not be neglected, and proposes a series of
legislative reforms so that Congress and the IRS can act
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prospectively, rather than retrospectively, to minimize the future
threat to U.S. tax compliance.
INTRODUCTION
Tax compliance depends heavily on institutions acting as
intermediaries between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS).1 In the domestic context, employers submit W-2s to report
employee wages, banks use 1099-INTs to report interest payments,
companies procuring services send 1099-MISCs, and casinos
transmit W-2Gs to report substantial gambling winnings, to name a
few examples.2 Although taxpayers are obligated to pay income taxes
on income from all sources, regardless of whether the income is
reported to the IRS, income reported on intermediary-provided forms
constitutes the overwhelming majority of both reported (and taxed)
income.3 For international tax enforcement, the IRS relies heavily on
the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, which obligates foreign
entities to submit detailed reports on assets held overseas.4 This
information reporting is a primary mechanism by which the IRS
evaluates taxpayer returns for compliance.5
New technologies are decentralizing the economy and threatening
the extent to which the IRS can rely on these intermediaries.
1. See, e.g., Omri Marian, A Conceptual Framework for the Regulation of Cryptocurrencies, 82 U.
CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 53, 57 (2015) (“[O]ur financial-regulation system heavily relies on regulating
intermediaries that are uniquely positioned to disrupt misconduct.”).
2. IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CAT. NO. 2811V, 1040 INSTRUCTIONS (2016),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1040gi.pdf. Other examples of intermediary-provided forms include
various versions of Form 1098 (mortgage interest, refund of overpaid interest, mortgage interest
premiums, and student loan interest, qualified tuition payments) and Form 1099 (canceled debt,
dividends received, capital gains, unemployment compensation, royalties, original issue discount, health
savings account distributions). Id. at 11.
3. Data Book 2010, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, Oct. 1, 2009–Sept. 30, 2010, at 22–30
(IRS, Wash. D.C.), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10databk.pdf. According to IRS Statistics of Income
for 2010, the aggregate amount of “other income” listed in the approximately 140 million returns
submitted is $34 billion out of a total of $8.2 trillion of income reported, or 0.4%. See id.
4. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, §§ 501-502, 124 Stat.
97-109, 1471-74 (2010) (imposing penalties and obligations on foreign financial institutions not
complying with FATCA requirements). See also infra notes 33–65 and accompanying text.
5. Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 213–14 (2016).
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Companies in the rapidly growing “sharing” (or “gig” or “on-demand
platform”) economy disclaim the employer/employee relationship
and the reporting obligations it implies.6 By 2020, it is estimated that
approximately 40% of the workforce will earn at least some income
from the sharing/on-demand economic sector.7 Additionally, new
payment methods, such as blockchain technologies, can eliminate
intermediaries altogether, facilitating direct, high-value, peer-to-peer
transactions.8 In an economy in which intermediaries play a
diminished role, the information provided to the IRS becomes
increasingly incomplete, hindering IRS enforcement and eroding the
income tax base. Current regulatory oversight is woefully incomplete
at addressing these concerns.9 How should Congress and the IRS
confront these challenges?
This paper proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of
taxpayer noncompliance in the United States and concludes that
current enforcement measures implicitly rely on centralized
intermediaries to compel compliance. Part II analyzes the effects that
two increasingly relevant technologies, the sharing economy and the
distributed-ledger blockchain, have on reducing the need for
traditional intermediaries and the resulting effect on taxpayer
compliance. Part III proposes specific recommendations for how
Congress and the IRS can contend with a decentralized economy.

6. See generally CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD SCH. OF BUS., SHORTCHANGED: THE TAX
COMPLIANCE CHALLENGES OF SMALL BUSINESS OPERATORS DRIVING THE ON-DEMAND PLATFORM
ECONOMY 1 (2016), http://www.american.edu/kogod/news/Shortchanged.cfm. See infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
7. BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 8 (citing Arjan Schutte & Colleen Poynton, 1099 Problems and W2s
Ain’t One: The 1099 Economy’s Problems, Advantages, and Outlook, CB INSIGHTS (Sept. 15, 2015) and
INTUIT, INTUIT 2020 REPORT (2010)).
8. See infra notes 208–222 and accompanying text.
9. See David Kocieniewski, Airbnb, Others Pay Out Billions Beneath IRS’s Radar: Study,
HARTFORD COURANT (May 24, 2016, 2:00 PM), http://www.courant.com/business/hc-peer-to-peetcompany-taxes-20160523-story.html;
I.R.S.
Notice
2014-21,
2014-16
I.R.B.
938,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-irbs/irb14-16.pdf; American Bar Association, Comment Letter on I.R.S.
Notice
2014-21
(Mar.
24,
2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/taxation/policy/032415comments.authchec
kdam.pdf (stating that Notice 2014-21 leaves many unanswered questions regarding how cryptocurrency
questions should be taxed).
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I. The Current State of Taxpayer Noncompliance
A. The United States Tax Gap
Nearly half a trillion dollars of tax liability owed to the U.S.
government from domestic activities goes uncollected.10 For the
2008, 2009, and 2010 tax years (the most recent period for which
data is available), the IRS estimates the gross annual tax gap—the
amount of true tax liability that is not paid voluntarily and timely—
sits at $458 billion.11 This amount, the total tax gap from all domestic
federal tax bases, represents approximately 18% of the $2.5 trillion
true annual tax liability.12 The tax gap calculation likely does not
include the entire international tax gap,13 with a relatively recent
estimate of the revenue lost due to offshore activities as high as $255
billion.14
The IRS calculates the tax gap by extrapolating from data obtained
from audited returns over multiple years to construct a model of all
U.S. taxpayers.15 This model permits the IRS to estimate the tax gap
across categories of noncompliance and further allocate the tax gap to
10. IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1415(5-2016), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH:
TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010, at 1 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/p1415.pdf.
11. Id. The annual net tax gap, which takes into account taxes eventually paid, is estimated to be
$406 billion, or $52 billion less than the gross tax gap. Id. Only $2,038 trillion (81.7% of the true tax
liability) is paid voluntarily and timely. Id. at 7.
12. Id. at 7. The individual income tax, employment tax (levied on wages), corporate income tax,
estate tax, and excise tax comprise $319 billion (69.6%), $91 billion (19.9%), $44 billion (9.6%), $4
billion (0.9%), and less than $1 billion (less than 0.1%) of the annual gross tax gap, respectively. Id.
13. See PHILIP SHROPSHIRE, TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., No. 2009-IE-R001, A
COMBINATION OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS AND INCREASED IRS CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY ARE
REQUIRED TO REDUCE THE MULTI-BILLION DOLLAR U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAX GAP 3
(2009), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta/iereports/2009reports/2009IER001fr.html (“[I]dentifying hidden
income within international activity is very difficult and time-consuming.”).
14. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 CONN.
L. REV. 675, 701 (2012). The low end of the estimate is approximately $50 billion. Id. The tax gap
estimate also excludes illegal source income. William L. Burke, Tax Information Reporting and
Compliance in the Cross-Border Context, 27 VA. TAX REV. 399, 435 (2007) (“Taxes on illegal activities
are excluded from these estimates.”).
15. Nina E. Olson, Minding the Gap: A Ten-Step Program for Better Tax Compliance, 20 STAN. L.
& POL’Y REV. 7, 8–9 (2009); IRS, supra note 10, at 10; IRS, TAX YEAR 2006 TAX GAP ESTIMATE–
SUMMARY OF ESTIMATION METHODS 1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06rastg12methods.pdf.
This modeling is conducted under the auspices of the IRS’s National Research Program. Olson, supra.
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specific tax bases and types of taxpayers.16 As discussed in the next
Section, the bulk of the tax gap is from the individual income tax,
with underreporting being the largest category of taxpayer
noncompliance, and business income underreporting the largest
subcategory.17 The IRS divides taxpayer noncompliance into three
primary categories: underreporting, underpayment, and nonfiling.18
Taxpayer underreporting occurs when taxpayers understate the
income on which they owe taxes, thereby underreporting their true
tax liability.19 Underpayment occurs when taxpayers do not pay the
tax they owe, and nonfiling occurs when taxpayers simply do not file
a return.20
Of these three categories, taxpayer underreporting (of not only
income but other attributes from which tax is calculated) makes up
the vast majority of the tax collection shortfall. Approximately $387
billion, or 85%, of the annual gross tax gap results from
underreporting of the true tax owed on timely filed returns.21 The tax
gap associated with the two other categories of taxpayer
noncompliance—underpayment and nonfiling—comprises a much
smaller percentage of total noncompliance.22 Taxpayer underpayment
accounts for approximately $39 billion (8.5%) of the annual gross tax
gap, whereas taxpayer nonfiling accounts for approximately $32
billion (7.0%).23 In short, taxpayers’ failure to pay taxes is due
largely to their failure to report all of their income.
B. Taxpayer Underreporting of Income and Tax Compliance
The IRS frequently receives information relevant to a given
taxpayer from parties other than the taxpayer herself. “Information
16. See generally IRS, supra note 10, at 10. Bases include income, employment, estate, and excise
taxes. Individual and corporate taxpayers are both part of the tax gap analysis. Id.
17. Id. at 7.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id. at 3.
21. IRS, supra note 10, at 2.
22. See id. at 8.
23. Id. at 2.
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reporting” refers to the statutorily obligated submissions to the IRS of
information (known as “information reports” or “information
returns”) regarding the taxpayer by some third party, typically an
entity making a payment to the taxpayer.24 In the case of reporting
associated with the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA),
however, the information reporting concerns the foreign financial
institution’s submission of information regarding the U.S. taxpayer’s
overseas assets, rather than any payment made by the reporter to the
U.S. taxpayer.25
Information reporting requires these third-party intermediaries to
submit information to the IRS on transactions involving, among other
things, trade or business payments, compensation for services,
interest payments, dividends, foreign investments and transactions,
and sales by brokers.26 Common information returns include Form
W-2, which reports wage information; the various Forms 1099; and
Forms 8966 and 8957, which relate to FATCA.27
Taxpayers are obligated to pay income taxes on income from all
sources, regardless of whether the income is reported to the IRS via
an information return.28 But the degree to which taxpayers fail to
include income on their tax returns, or underreport, is directly related
to the extent these income items are subject to information
reporting.29 When substantial information reporting is combined with
24. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (2013); infra note 61 and accompanying text.
25. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (2013); see discussion infra notes 48–65 and accompanying text.
FATCA also requires that taxpayers self-report certain foreign assets on Form 8938. Comparison of
Form 8938 and FBAR Requirements, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/comparison-of-form-8938and-fbar-requirements (last updated Sept. 5, 2017).
26. See discussion infra notes 111–123 and accompanying text.
27. See, e.g., IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CAT. NO. 59612Q, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8966
(2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8966.pdf; IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CAT. NO. 59561K,
INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 8957 (2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8957.pdf. In 2016, the IRS
estimated 250,188,751 Form W-2s and 2,341,982,873 1099s (across all types) were submitted,
respectively. IRS, PUBLICATION 6961, at 4 (2017). This constitutes about 83% of all information returns
submitted. For purposes of this Article, the term “information reporting” also includes the reporting
imposed on foreign entities by the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.
28. Treas. Reg. § 61(a) (2012) (“[G]ross income means all income from whatever source derived.”).
29. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1733, 1735 (2010) [hereinafter
Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps]; Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third
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withholding of tax by the reporting intermediary, as is done for wage
payments reported on Form W-2, for example, the net misreporting
percentage is only 1%, or $5 billion, of the approximately $500
billion of total income from these sources that should have been
reported.30
As a smaller proportion of income is reported via mandated
information returns, rates of underreporting noncompliance increase.
For sources of income subject to only some information reporting,
including income from partnerships, S-corporations, trust and estate
allocations, alimony payments, and capital gains, the net
misreporting percentage increases to 19%, or $33 billion, of the
approximately $174 billion from these sources that should have been
reported.31 For sources of income subject to little or no information
Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 698 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory
Speed Bumps]; Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 975–
76 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Tax Compliance]; Jay A. Soled, Call for the Gradual Phase-Out of All
Paper Tax Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 347 (2010) (“[T]he issuance of tax
information statements/returns such as Form W-2s and Form 1099s, furnished annually to taxpayers, has
played a vital role in the administration of our nation’s income tax system and in bolstering
compliance.”).
30. IRS, supra note 10, at 18. The net misreporting percentage for a given line item is the total net
misreported amount (the sum of all amounts underreported minus the sum of all amounts overreported)
divided by the sum of the absolute values of the amounts that should have been reported. Id. at 4–5. As a
result of withholding, taxpayers are incentivized to file a return in order to obtain credit for the amounts
withheld. See generally Lily Kahng, Investment Income Withholding in the United States and Germany,
10 FLA. TAX REV. 315 (2010) (“Withholding has proven to be the single most effective enforcement
mechanism for collecting taxes on income from labor.”); Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note
29, at 731–33. Withholding by a payor (a private party who transfers an amount to another private party)
is more administratively burdensome than simply reporting amounts paid. See Richard L. Doernberg,
The Case Against Withholding, 61 TEX. L. REV. 595, 603 (1982) (“The mechanics of the income tax
withholding requirements are simple in appearance but quite complicated in application.”). The onus of
withholding was a factor in Senate rejection of House bills calling for withholding expansion to include
other forms of income. Id. at 604 n.58 (“The Senate objected that the provisions would impose heavy
burdens on businesses, which would be required to perform the withholding and collection functions for
the government.”). But information reporting in the absence of withholding still has a significant
salutary effect on rates of taxpayer income underreporting. Income items subject to substantial
information reporting but not withholding still have only a 7% net misreporting percentage, or $15
billion, of the approximately $214 billion of income from these sources that should have been reported.
IRS, supra note 10, at 18. These sources of income include interest income, dividend income, state
income tax refunds, pensions and annuities, unemployment compensation, and taxable social security
benefits. Id. These sources of income are reported on forms 1099-INT, 1099-DIV, 1099-G, 1099-R, and
SSA-1099, respectively. Id.
31. IRS, supra note 10, at 18. These sources of income are reported on Schedule K-1 (partnership, Scorp, trust, and estate allocations), Form 1040 (alimony), and Schedule D (capital gains). Id.
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reporting, such as income from sales of business property, proprietor
income, farm income, rents and royalties, and other miscellaneous
income, the net misreporting percentage is a staggering 63%, or $136
billion, of the approximately $216 billion of income from these
sources that should have been reported.32
C. International Tax Compliance
1. The Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts
Congress enacted the Bank Secrecy Act in 1970 to prevent the use
of foreign bank accounts for illegal purposes, including tax evasion.33
The Bank Secrecy Act required financial institutions to submit
information on certain transactions, such as large cash deposits and
withdrawals, to the federal government to aid regulatory and criminal
investigations.34 Part of the Bank Secrecy Act also requires certain
individuals connected to the United States to report foreign financial
assets and maintain records of transactions and relationships with
foreign financial agencies.35 The IRS enforces this Report of Foreign
Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), even though the Internal
Revenue Code does not obligate its submission and it is not
submitted with a taxpayer’s tax return.36 U.S. persons are required to
submit an FBAR if they had authority over at least one financial
32. Id. Compliance rates have varied slightly over the different periods the IRS has analyzed, but the
relative magnitudes of compliance for source of income grouping has remained relatively consistent. See
id.
33. See Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-507, §§ 241, 242, 84 Stat. 1114, 1124 (1970);
TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 332 (2014) (describing how Congress
was motivated to pass the Bank Secrecy Act after hearing testimony that criminals were using secret
foreign bank accounts for illegal purposes).
34. Eric J. Gouvin, Bringing Out the Big Guns: The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and the
War on Terrorism, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 963 (2003); see also 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5322 (2012).
35. 31 U.S.C. § 5314 (2012); Justin Scheid, FBAR: It’s Not a Four-Letter Word When Dealing with
the IRS, 26 DCBA BRIEF 30 (2013), http://www.dcba.org/mpage/vol261213art3.
36. Hale E. Sheppard, Evolution of the FBAR: Where We Were, Where We Are, and Why It Matters,
7 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 1, 28 (2006) (“The FBAR is not filed as an attachment to an individual’s
income tax return; rather, it must be sent separately to a Michigan address for the Treasury
Department.”); see also Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,489, 26,489 (May 16,
2003) (codified at 31 C.F.R. § 1010.810).
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account located outside of the United States, and the aggregate value
of all their financial accounts exceeded $10,000 at any time during
the relevant calendar year.37 Prior to FATCA’s enactment, discussed
in the next Section, FBAR was the primary mechanism by which the
IRS tracked offshore accounts.38
Compliance with FBAR reporting requirements was low, with the
IRS estimating a compliance rate of less than 20% in 2002.39 The
Treasury Department, in its report to Congress, acknowledged that
the FBAR rules, by obligating individual taxpayers rather than third
parties, hindered efforts at compliance.40 In an effort to spur selfreporting, Congress in 2004 increased penalties for noncompliance to
include both harsher penalties for willful noncompliance and, for the
first time, penalties for negligent violations.41 In addition to increased
penalties for FBAR noncompliance, the IRS also instituted various
voluntary disclosure programs in which taxpayers could voluntarily
report previously undisclosed assets, income, and other

37. FIN. CRIMES ENF’T NETWORK, BSA ELECTRONIC FILING REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORT OF
FOREIGN BANK AND FINANCIAL ACCOUNTS (FINCEN FORM 114) 4 (2017). The term “United States
person” includes U.S. citizens; U.S. residents; entities, including but not limited to, corporations,
partnerships, or limited liability companies, created or organized in the United States or under the laws
of the United States; and trusts or estates formed under the laws of the United States. Id. at 5.
38. Melissa A. Dizdarevic, The FATCA Provisions of the Hire Act: Boldly Going Where No
Withholding Has Gone Before, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2967, 2977 (2011).
39. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREAS., REPORT TO CONGRESS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 361(B) OF THE
UNITING AND STRENGTHENING AMERICA BY PROVIDING APPROPRIATE TOOLS REQUIRED TO INTERCEPT
AND OBSTRUCT TERRORISM ACT OF 2001 at 6 (2005) [hereinafter TREASURY FBAR REPORT]. The IRS
reported that up to one million taxpayers may have been required to file an FBAR. Id.; TAXPAYER
ADVOC. SERV., supra note 33, at 332.
40. TREASURY FBAR REPORT, supra note 39, at 10 (“Unlike other reports filed under the BSA, such
as Currency Transaction Reports or Suspicious Activity Reports, FBARs do not rely on reporting by
third parties.”).
41. TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 33 at 333; 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5) (2012) (setting forth
penalties for FBAR violations). For willful FBAR violations, the penalty is the greater of $100,000 or
half of the balance of the unreported account. 31 U.S.C. § 5321(a)(5). For a one-off negligent violation,
the IRS may impose a penalty of not more than $500, but a pattern of negligent violations could result in
a penalty of $50,000. Id.; see also Stephan Michael Brown, One-Size-Fits-Small: A Look at the History
of the FBAR Requirement, the Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Programs, and Suggestions for Increased
Participation and Future Compliance, 18 CHAP. L. REV. 243, 243 (2014) (“In response [to FBAR
noncompliance], the government has drastically increased the penalties for noncompliance.”).
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noncompliance in exchange for a recommendation against criminal
prosecution.42
Prior to the IRS taking over enforcement duties from the Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network, a bureau of the Treasury Department,
FBAR compliance was notoriously low.43 With the increased
penalties for FBAR noncompliance, FBAR filings increased
somewhat from 2003, when they numbered approximately 205,000,
to 2008, when FBAR filings were approximately 350,000.44 But even
with this uptick in filings, the FBAR program was still viewed as
notoriously noncompliant.45 In 2011 and 2012, however, FBAR
filings and, presumably, compliance increased significantly, with
filings numbering 741,000 and 807,000, respectively.46 A key reason
for this sudden increase in FBAR filings was the 2010 passage of the
FATCA, which pressures overseas centralized intermediaries into
providing information to the IRS.47
2. The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
In the wake of a well-publicized tax evasion case involving UBS, a
Swiss bank, and approximately 50,000 of their U.S. clients, Congress
began drafting legislation to combat the use of foreign accounts by
42. See Paul Marcotte, IRS Winning Game of Offshore Hide and Seek Update on FBARs, MD. BAR J.
5, 7 (2013) (describing Overseas Voluntary Disclosure Initiative programs); Leandra Lederman, The
Use of Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in the Battle Against Offshore Tax Evasion, 57 VILL. L. REV.
499, 514–17 (2012) [hereinafter Lederman, Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives] (detailing the Offshore
Voluntary Disclosure Initiatives in 2009 and 2011).
43. TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 208 (2011) (“Before [the IRS
took over enforcement], the FBAR filing requirements were not well known, noncompliance was the
norm, and the requirements were rarely enforced.”).
44. TREASURY FBAR REPORT, supra note 39, at 11 (listing 204,689 FBAR filers for 2003);
TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 142 (listing 349,667 FBAR filers for
2012).
45. Ruth Mason, Citizenship Taxation, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 169, 219 (2016) (“FBAR compliance is
notoriously low, perhaps because the United States does little outreach to inform taxpayers of their
FBAR obligations.”).
46. TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 44, at 134 (listing 741,249 FBAR filers for 2011);
TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 229 (2013) (listing 807,040 FBAR
filers for 2012).
47. Though FATCA was enacted in 2010, the obligations it imposed were phased in over a number
of years. See I.R.S. Announcement 2012–42, 2012–47 I.R.B. 561 (IRS announcement setting forth
FATCA timeline).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/1

10

Viswanathan: Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy

2018]

TAX COMPLIANCE IN A DECENTRALIZING ECONOMY

293

U.S. taxpayers to avoid paying U.S. income tax.48 Although the
FBAR obligations of the Bank Secrecy Act were intended to protect
against this very form of tax evasion, that legislation was seen as
inadequate in effectively ensuring foreign tax compliance.49 As stated
by Stephen Shay in 2009, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary for
International Tax Affairs, to the House Ways and Means Committee:
[W]hen accounts are hidden offshore, it is difficult to
identify taxpayers who are supposed to file the . . . FBAR
but do not. In addition, even when the IRS has evidence
that a taxpayer has a foreign account, it may be difficult,
time-consuming, and costly for the IRS to prove that the
account has a large enough balance to require the FBAR to
be filed and to assess applicable penalties.50
FBAR reporting did not ensure accurate reporting of accounts held
overseas, thus necessitating FATCA’s enactment.51
FATCA, enacted in 2010,52 primarily imposes reporting
obligations on foreign financial institutions.53 Though FATCA
creates some additional reporting obligations for individuals,54 the
48. Peter Nelson, Conflicts of Interest: Resolving Legal Barriers to the Implementation of the
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, 32 VA. TAX REV. 387, 390 (2012).
49. Foreign Bank Account Reporting and Tax Compliance: Hearing on H.R. 3933 and S. 1934
Before the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 111th Cong. 16 (2009).
50. Id. at 10–11.
51. Id. at 16.
52. FATCA was enacted as part of the Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No.
111-147, §§ 501–562, 124 Stat. 71, 97-118 (2010) (codified in various sections of the Internal Revenue
Code); 157 CONG. REC. S4518-19 (2011) (“FATCA [is] a tough new law designed to flush out hidden
offshore bank accounts.”).
53. Hearing on H.R. 3933 and S. 1934, supra note 49 (“This bill creates a new reporting regime for
foreign financial institutions . . . who will bear the brunt of this new disclosure.”).
54. Id. at 16 (“[FATCA] is tailored for both individual and corporate taxpayers.”). Individual
taxpayers are required to report, directly to the IRS, an information statement concerning assets they
hold overseas. Id. at 3. FATCA requires taxpayers having any interest in a specified foreign financial
asset with an aggregate value greater than $50,000 to submit Form 8938 to the IRS as part of the
taxpayer’s return. Treas. Reg. § 1.6038D-2 (2015). Forms 114 and 8938 differ in who must file;
inclusion of U.S. territories in the definition of “United States”; threshold value reported; when a
taxpayer has an interest in the relevant interest; what is reported; asset valuation; filing date deadline;
where to file; penalties; and which foreign assets are reportable. Comparison of Form 8938 and FBAR

Published by Reading Room, 2018

11

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1

294

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

bulk of its requirements burden overseas institutions holding
accounts of U.S. persons.55 FATCA requires foreign financial
institutions to enter into agreements with the IRS to provide
information on the accounts of the foreign financial institutions’ U.S.
account holders.56 Any foreign financial institution57 that does not
meet FATCA’s reporting requirements is subjected to a 30%
withholding tax on payments from U.S. sources paid to non-U.S.
persons.58 Prior to FATCA, these U.S. source payments to non-U.S.
persons were generally exempt from withholding tax.59 This
additional withholding tax creates a strong incentive for foreign
Requirements, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/comparison-of-form-8938-and-fbar-requirements
(last updated Sept. 5, 2017). This obligation, Form 8938, is distinct from and in addition to the FBAR’s
Form 114, which must be filed with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. Lederman, Voluntary
Disclosure Initiatives, supra note 42, at 512 (“This requirement may overlap with the FBAR, but it has a
higher reporting threshold and includes non-cash assets.”); see generally I.R.S. News Release IR-201642 (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/foreign-account-filings-top-1-million-taxpayersneed-to-know-their-filing-requirements (describing some of the intricacies of Form 114 and Form
8938).
55. Hearing on H.R. 3933 and S. 1934, supra note 49.
56. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 1471(b), 124 Stat. 71, 97
(2010). Nonfinancial foreign entities are also required to submit information proving they do not have
any substantial U.S. owners. Id. § 1472(b).
57. A financial institution is defined as any entity that:
(i) Accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar
business . . . (ii) Holds, as a substantial portion of its business . . . financial
assets for the benefit of one or more other persons . . . (iii) Is an investment
entity . . . (iv) Is an insurance company or a holding company . . . that is a
member of an expanded affiliated group that includes an insurance
company, and the insurance company or holding company issues, or is
obligated to make payments with respect to, a cash value insurance or
annuity contract . . . (v) Is an entity that is a holding company or treasury
center . . . that— (A) Is part of an expanded affiliated group that includes a
depository institution, custodial institution, specified insurance company,
or investment entity . . . or (B) Is formed in connection with or availed of
by a collective investment vehicle, mutual fund, exchange traded fund,
private equity fund, hedge fund, venture capital fund, leveraged buyout
fund, or any similar investment vehicle established with an investment
strategy of investing, reinvesting, or trading in financial assets.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(1) (2013).
58. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-147, § 1471(b), 124 Stat. 71, 97
(2010). These U.S. source payments include payments of interest, dividends, royalties, and the proceeds
of sales of items producing interest or dividends from U.S. sources. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-1(b)(113)3406(b)(3) (2013).
59. See generally I.R.C. § 871 (2010) (tax on nonresident alien individuals) and I.R.C. § 881 (1993)
(tax on income of foreign corporations not connected with United States business).
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financial institutions to supply the information the IRS requests or rid
themselves of U.S. account holders.60 The desired result of FATCA
is for the IRS to learn about foreign assets held overseas in order to
ensure compliance with all taxes that might be owed from owning
these foreign assets.61
In order to standardize FATCA reporting between the IRS and the
relevant foreign entities, the Department of the Treasury has
negotiated intergovernmental agreements with several foreign
countries.62 An intergovernmental agreement provides for the
reporting of relevant financial account information (that of U.S.
account holders) to the tax authorities in that country.63 This permits
foreign financial institutions to tell their own governments about
U.S.-owned accounts, and the foreign governments then give the
information to the IRS.64 The U.S. has been extremely successful in
reaching international cooperation with regard to FATCA; as of this
writing, there are 113 countries that have intergovernmental
agreements with the U.S.65

60. Hiring Incentives to Restore Employment Act, Pub. L. 111-147, § 1471(b)(1)(F)(ii), 124 Stat. 97
(2010). Corporate affiliation rules prevent simply cabining all U.S. account holders into a related
corporate entity. Id. § 1471(e).
61. See Hearing on H.R. 3933 and S. 1934, supra note 49 (“[The FATCA] gives the Treasury
Department the necessary tools it needs to get tough with those Americans hiding their assets
overseas.”).
62. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, U.S. Engaging with More than 50 Jurisdictions to
Curtail Offshore Tax Evasion (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1759.aspx.
63. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Releases Model Intergovernmental
Agreement for Implementing the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act to Improve Offshore Tax
Compliance and Reduce Burden (July 26, 2012), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1653.aspx. Under the reciprocal form of the model intergovernmental agreement the
U.S. agrees to “exchange information currently collected on accounts held in U.S. financial institutions
by residents of partner countries,” with the goal of achieving comparable levels of information exchange
between the U.S. and the partner country. Id.
64. Allison Bennett, IRS to Countries: Hurry up with FATCA Reporting Enforcement, TAX MGMT.
WKLY. REP. (Aug 8, 2016).
65. Foreign Accountant Tax Compliance Act (FATCA), U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY,
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/treaties/Pages/FATCA.aspx (last updated Sept. 15,
2017); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE FATCA FINAL REGULATIONS:
FOREIGN PASSTHRU PAYMENTS WITHHOLDING, REP. NO. 1362 (Jan. 19, 2017) (questioning the need for
FATCA withholding given IRS success in signing intergovernmental agreements).
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In transitioning from using FBAR to using FATCA to deter
international tax evasion by U.S. persons, Congress and the IRS
tacitly acknowledged that obligating centralized intermediaries was
necessary to catalyze tax compliance.66 Even after harsh penalties for
FBAR violations were imposed in 2004, noncompliance remained
rampant because obligating individuals—as opposed to large,
centralized intermediaries—was simply not as effective.67 Only after
taxpayers were made aware that information on their foreign
accounts would soon be reported did voluntary self-disclosures on
these taxpayers’ foreign assets begin to increase.68 Without
centralized intermediaries to obligate, information reporting and
FATCA/FBAR reporting would not be effective, and tax compliance
would suffer.
D. The Reliance on Centralized Institutions for Successful
Information Reporting
To the extent that information reporting increases tax compliance,
it does so by relying primarily on documentation submitted to the
IRS by third-party intermediaries, rather than relying on
documentation submitted by individuals. The statutory and regulatory
framework for imposing information reporting obligations implicitly
acknowledges that centralized institutions are easier to regulate than
individuals.69 In this context, the term “centralized” is used to refer to
intermediaries that transact with large numbers of counterparties
relative to the number of intermediaries with which these
66. Letter from Stephen B. Land, Chair N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, to Mark Mazur, Assistant Secretary
(Tax
Policy),
Dep’t
of
the
Treasury
(Jan.
19,
2017),
https://www.nysba.org/Sections/Tax/Tax_Section_Reports/Tax_Reports_2017/Tax_Section_Letter_136
2.html.
67. See Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L.
REV. 655, 666 (2006).
68. See I.R.S. News Release IR-2016-137 (Oct. 21, 2016).
69. TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., supra note 33, at 334 (“Civil penalties for failure to report foreign
accounts on an FBAR can be disproportionate in comparison to the value of the unreported account and
the amount of associated unreported income.”); Cheng, supra note 67, at 666 (“Institutions, usually in
the form of corporations, are easier to regulate because they are smaller in number, have known
locations, and have significant economic incentives to comply with government mandates.”).
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counterparties are doing business.70 A bank paying interest to its
account holders is one such example. Even though the account holder
might have accounts at multiple banks, the average number of
account holders at a given bank is much larger than the average
number of banks holding accounts for a given taxpayer.71 The IRS
can rely upon these centralized information reporters to actually give
the information they are asked to provide. Penalties for failing to file
information reports are easier to impose when there are fewer entities
to regulate.72 Additionally, these centralized information reporters are
generally engaging in arms-length transactions with the taxpayers
about whom they are submitting information reports.73
Current law imposes obligations on payors making payments in
the course of their trade or business, and not on all payments
generally.74 This excludes payments made by consumers, even
though these payments are often income to the payee and comprise a
large part of total underreporting noncompliance.75 Income from
small businesses (nonfarm proprietor income), which is largely
generated through consumer transactions, comprises 29% of the
entire individual income tax underreporting gap.76 This represents the
largest share of all the line items the IRS assesses.77 This is a
consequence of larger, centralized payors being subject to the
information reporting requirements with greater frequency than
smaller, decentralized payors, such as individuals.78 Small, cashbased businesses are difficult to tax.

70. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1170.
71. See generally id.
72. The penalties for failing to correctly file an information return are determined on a per-return
basis, subject to a penalty cap ranging from $500,000 to $3 million depending on the severity of the
errors. See generally I.R.C. § 6721 (2012).
73. See infra notes 84–87 and accompanying text.
74. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(a) (2013).
75. Joseph Bankman, Eight Truths About Collecting Taxes from the Cash Economy, TAX NOTES, *8
(2007) (“[C]onsumers are exempt from filing information returns.”).
76. IRS, supra note 10, at 18.
77. Id. This income is misreported at a rate of 64%. Id.
78. Id. at 19.
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The lack of information reporting associated with these
underreported sources of income is not typically due to inadequate
legislative and regulatory oversight.79 In other words, the issue is that
these underreporting taxpayers are obtaining their income from
sources that are difficult to regulate, not that Congress does not want
these payments reported.80 Imposing an information reporting
obligation on parties with no incentive to report would not only likely
be ineffective, but would also highlight to the public the extent to
which tax laws go unenforced. As such, the sources of income with
little or no information reporting are generally also the sources of
income for which information reporting is the most challenging to
enforce.81 By virtue of the information reporting obligations
Congress and the IRS have set forth, they have implicitly
acknowledged the difficulty of regulating entities other than large,
centralized intermediaries, even though the bulk of underreporting
noncompliance is attributable to these smaller payors.
Rental payments to property owners, for example, are
underreported at a rate of 62%.82 Although these rental payments are
not covered by any existing information reporting requirement,83
simply enacting a statute requiring renters to report amounts paid to
their landlords would likely be ineffective. Without an additional
incentive (either by carrot or by stick), any reporting requirement
covering rental payments would be hard to enforce. Any such attempt
at incentivizing could result in collusion between renter and
landlord.84 Contrast this to the relationship between a bank and a
79. That being said, there are some areas where heightened reporting requirements could reduce the
underreporting gap without a significant increase in administrative burdens. See infra note 196; see
generally Jay A. Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 VA. TAX REV. 371 (2007).
80. Information reporting standards are often modified to capture income reporting where
compliance is likely. For example, starting in 2011, brokers have been required to state a customer’s
adjusted basis for securities sold by the broker on the customer’s behalf during the year. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6045-1(v)(B)(d)(ii) (2013).
81. IRS, supra note 10, at 18.
82. Id. Underreporting for rents and royalties comprises about $20 billion, or 8%, of the total gross
tax gap. Id.
83. Consumptive payments are not typically subjected to information reporting rules. See infra
section II.D.
84. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 29 at 731–33.
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typical interest-earning client, for example. Given the size of the
bank relative to the client, there is little opportunity for negotiation to
occur between bank and customer to avoid information reporting,
even if such collusion would result in a mutually beneficial, taxefficient outcome. This is true even in the absence of penalties which,
for centralized intermediaries with many customers, could be harsh.85
Consider an effort to incentivize renters to report payments to
landlords via a renter’s credit.86 The hypothetical legislation would
give tenants a 1% credit for rent paid to a landlord and reported on an
information return. Although such a measure would motivate renters
to submit the required paperwork, a savvy landlord would simply
reduce her tenant’s rent by greater than one percent in exchange for
the renter’s nonfiling of the information return.87 Given that the
enforcement of information reporting is not an IRS priority,88 such
collusion could be rampant. As a result, obtaining proper reporting
for rental income remains challenging. Any effective information
reporting protocol depends, in large part, on centralized
intermediaries providing the information returns to the IRS.
The heart of the statutory scheme governing information reporting
on payments is § 6041, which requires:
All persons engaged in a trade or business and making
payment in the course of such trade or business to another
person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums, annuities,
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed
or determinable gains, profits, and income . . . of $600 or
more in any taxable year . . . shall render a true and
accurate return . . . setting forth the amount of such gains,
85. See supra notes 71–73 and accompanying text.
86. See Kenya Covington & Rodney Harrell, From Renting to Homeownership: Using Tax
Incentives to Encourage Homeownership Among Renters, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 111 (2007);
Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Reform Discourse, 32 VA. TAX REV. 205, 264 (2012).
87. This assumes the reported rent paid by the tenant would be taxable to the landlord at a rate
greater than 1%.
88. Bankman, supra note 75, at *12–*13 (“Looking to see whether a taxpayer has met its reporting
obligations is not an audit priority.”).
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profits, and income, and the name and address of the
recipient of such payment.89
Section 6041 is a general provision; if a payment otherwise
qualifies under § 6041 but is covered by another statute, the reporting
requirements of the other statute take precedence.90 For example,
payments related to dividends and corporate earnings and profits,
patronage dividends, trusts and annuity plans, payments of interest,
and payments of royalties have different reporting requirements.91
Various exceptions to this rule also apply, most notably for payments
to corporations.92
1.

Payments of Compensation

The lion’s share of reported income, approximately 68%, is
reported on Form W-2,93 which lists wages paid and requires the
withholding of taxes.94 Large food and beverage establishments with
employees receiving compensation primarily through tips must
allocate to these employees 8% of the establishment’s gross receipts,
minus whatever the employee reports.95 Other compensation not
89. I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2012). If a payment qualifies under sections 6042 (dividends and corporate
earnings and profits), 6044 (patronage dividends), 6047(e) (trusts and annuity plans), 6049(a) (payments
of interest), or 6050N(a) (payments of royalties) the reporting rules of those sections apply. See
generally IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CAT. NO. 27976F, GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR CERTAIN
INFORMATIONAL RETURNS (2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1099gi.pdf [hereinafter GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS].
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3(a) (2013).
91. See I.R.C. § 6042 (2012) (dividends and corporate earnings and profits); I.R.C. § 6044 (2012)
(patronage dividends); I.R.C. § 6047(e) (2012) (trusts and annuity plans); I.R.C. § 6049(a) (2012)
(payments of interest); I.R.C. § 6050N(a) (2012) (payments of royalties); see generally GENERAL
INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 89.
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (2013). Other exceptions to section 6041 include payments to (1) taxexempt organizations; (2) governments; (3) real estate agents of rent; and (4) scholarship recipients of
scholarships properly excluded under section 117. Id. This exception was eliminated in 2010 by
section 6041(i), but section 6041(i) was subsequently repealed, leaving the exception in place. Id.
93. In 2010 the total amount of reported income was $8.208 trillion, of which $5.594 trillion was
reported on Form W-2s. See 2010 Estimated Data Line Counts Individual Income Tax Returns, DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, IRS, at 14 (2010); INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2010 STATS. OF INCOME, Table 5.A.3.
Summary of Items for Taxpayers with Form W-2, by Return and Earner Type, Tax Year 2010.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-2(a) (2017).
95. 23 U.S.C. § 6053(c)(3) (2014). Large food and beverage establishments are defined as a business
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otherwise qualifying for Form W-2 reporting generally will qualify
for Form 1099-MISC reporting, provided the amount is greater than
$600.96
The average number of W-2 forms per individual is approximately
1.2,97 but the average number of employees per employer is far
higher.98 A majority of Americans, approximately 51.6% in 2012,
work for companies with over 500 employees, with only 17.6% of
the American workforce working at companies with fewer than
twenty employees.99 The information reporting associated with
compensation thus regulates primarily larger, more centralized
institutions.
2. Payments of Interest and Dividends
Both interest and dividend payments greater than $10 are reported
on Forms 1099-INT and 1099-DIV, respectively. Only “qualifying”
interest is required to be reported.100 Interest arising from obligations
in registered form, the most common qualifying type, encompasses a
broad range of debt instruments since registration is a prerequisite for
the deduction of the interest paid.101 Interest on the debt of
individuals, among other types of interest, is exempt from this
reporting requirement.102 Interest payments constitute approximately

that typically employs more than ten employees daily where tipping is customary. Id. at § 6053(c)(4).
96. I.R.C. § 6041(a) (2017).
97. The total number of W-2 forms distributed in 2015 was approximately 255 million. IRS,
PUBLICATION 6961 (2016). These W-2s were received by individuals filing approximately 150 million
returns. IRS, SOI TAX STATS tbl. 1.2, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15in12ms.xls. Of these 150
million returns, approximately 55 million were of couples filing jointly, so approximately 205 million
individuals are represented by these 150 million returns. Id. This results in approximately 1.2 W-2 forms
per individual (255,000,000 W-2 forms ÷ 205,000,000 individuals).
98. ANTHONY CARUSO, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, G12-SUSB, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES
EMPLOYMENT
AND
PAYROLL
SUMMARY:
2012
at
1
(2015),
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2015/econ/g12-susb.pdf.
99. Id. at 2.
100. I.R.C. § 6049(b) (2012). Qualifying categories include (1) obligations in registered form; (2)
obligations of a type issued to the public; (3) bank deposits; and (4) deposits with brokers. Id.
101. I.R.C. § 163(f) (2012).
102. I.R.C. § 6049(b)(2)(A) (2012). Individuals are not, therefore, obligated to send information
reports to banks to which they pay interest. See id.
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1% of all reported income.103 Dividend payments are also subject to
the $10 threshold, with recipients receiving a Form 1099-DIV.104
Information reporting on dividends is not required for certain
recipients, including corporations, tax-exempt entities, and
governments.105 Although payments of interest and dividends made
by foreign payors are includible in a U.S. taxpayer’s income, foreign
payors are not subject to the reporting obligations that obligate U.S.
payors.106 Under FATCA, however, the assets generating these
interest and dividend payments are reportable.107
Interest and dividend payments are typically made by large
entities, usually either financial institutions or publicly traded
companies.108 As is the case with payments of compensation, payors
of interest and dividends are typically outnumbered by the customers
they are serving.109 The information reporting requirements
applicable to these payments almost exclusively obligate large,
centralized entities rather than small businesses or individuals.110
3. Transactions Involving Brokers
The Treasury has broad authority to regulate the information
returns that brokers must submit. For this purpose, a “broker” is
defined as any “person who (for consideration) regularly acts as a
middleman with respect to property or services.”111 Brokers in
securities, commodities, and certain financial instruments are the
brokers for whom the treasury regulations specify the greatest detail
103. In 2015, the estimated total amount of taxable interest reported was approximately $96 billion
out of total income reported of $10.36 trillion. IRS, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS LINE ITEM
ESTIMATES, 2015, at 15 (2016) (line 8a).
104. I.R.C. § 6042(a)(1) (2012).
105. Id. § 6042(b)(2)(B).
106. Id.
107. See infra notes 128–133 and accompanying text. There is also an individual reporting obligation.
See supra notes 46–59.
108. See IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CAT. NO. 27978B, INSTRUCTIONS FOR FORM 1099-DIV
(2016), www.irs.gov/ form1099div.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. I.R.C. § 6045(a), (c) (2012).
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of reporting obligations.112 Brokers are required to report the gross
proceeds from sales and the adjusted basis of securities sold by the
broker on their customer’s behalf during the year.113
Brokers are typically institutional third parties who have
experience dealing with financial instruments.114 Brokers typically
serve many customers and therefore are centralized relative to their
clients.115 It is relatively straightforward to impose regulatory
burdens on most brokers because they are often certified by another
regulatory body, such as the Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC).116 Therefore, payors submitting 1099-Bs are almost always
larger, centralized institutions and entities.
4. Other Transactions Requiring Information Reporting
The IRS requires information returns for many other situations in
which a payor remits payment to a taxpayer.117 Similar to the
transactions described above, these payors are typically centralized
entities where the number of payees is large relative to the number of
payors.118 In addition, these payee entities are, due to their size and
112. See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.6045-1 (2010).
113. I.R.C. § 6045(g). Only sales of a “covered security” are required to be reported. Id. Covered
securities encompass a wide range of products, including corporate stock, commodity and derivatives
contracts, and certain debt instruments. See I.R.C. § 6045.
114. I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1).
115. Over 1.8 billion 1099-Bs were submitted to the IRS in 2016. IRS, REV. 7-2016, PUBLICATION
6961 2017 UPDATE: CALENDAR YEAR PROJECTIONS OF INFORMATION AND WITHHOLDING DOCUMENTS
FOR THE UNITED STATES AND IRS CAMPUSES 4 (2017).
116. See generally Jonathan Macey & Caroline Novogrod, Enforcing Self-Regulatory Organization’s
Penalties and the Nature of Self-Regulation, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 963, 964 (2012). Individuals trading
in securities often obtain Series 7 certification, for example. The Series 7 exam is administered by the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA). Id. FINRA is, in turn, regulated by the SEC. Id.
117. See I.R.C. §§ 6039, 6039D–F, 6039I, 6043, 6043A, 6044, 6047, 6050E–F, 6050H–Q, 6050S–T,
6050W (2012). These include but are not limited to certain options transactions; certain fringe benefits
plans; large gifts from foreign persons; employer-owned life insurance contracts; liquidating
transactions of corporations; taxable mergers and acquisitions; payments of patronage dividends; certain
trusts and annuity plans; state and local income tax refunds; social security benefits; mortgage interest
received; cash received in a trade or business; foreclosures and abandonments of security; exchanges of
certain partnership interests; certain donated property; contracts from Federal executive agencies;
payments of royalties; cancellation of indebtedness; long-term care benefits; higher education costs;
health insurance costs; payments made in settlement of payment card and third party network
transactions. See id.
118. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1170.
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financial significance, easier to regulate.119 It is difficult, for
example, for a state government issuing tax refunds (which are
included in recipients’ federal gross income) to escape the regulatory
reach of the IRS.120 The vast majority of the miscellaneous reporting
rules apply to financial institutions, corporations engaging in
reorganization, and governmental branches—all entities with
relatively high levels of sophistication and regulatory oversight.121
Section 6050W of the Internal Revenue Code obligates certain
intermediaries making payments on behalf of other parties to submit
information reports on Form 1099-K to the payees only if the total
number of transactions to a given payee is greater than 200 and the
total dollar amount of all transactions exceeds $20,000.122 Many
companies involved in the sharing economy characterize their
relationship to payees as one falling under this more relaxed
reporting requirement.123 Since the payors often do not reach these
threshold requirements, the corresponding payees often receive no
information report from the payor.
5. FATCA Reporting of Foreign Assets
FATCA-mandated reporting concerns assets held overseas rather
than payments made between parties.124 In order to avoid the 30%
withholding tax, a foreign financial institution must provide the
following information for each U.S. account it maintains: (1) the
identifying information on the account, including the taxpayer
119. Cheng, supra note 67, at 666 (“Institutions, usually in the form of corporations, are easier to
regulate because they are smaller in number, have known locations, and have significant economic
incentives to comply with government mandates.”).
120. A state government whose income tax refund was not included in the taxpayer’s federal gross
income would be incentivized to over-withhold due to the time value of money. Taxpayers deducting
the overpayment of state income taxes in the previous year would also prefer this result, assuming that
the value of the deduction is worth more than the loss in time value of money from the overwithholding.
121. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
122. I.R.C. § 6050W. The intermediaries required to submit these Form 1099-Ks are known as “third
party settlement organizations.” Id. These organizations are a subset of the category of intermediaries
known as “payment settlement entities.” Id.
123. Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1034 (2016).
124. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1) (2012).
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identification number(s);125 (2) the account number and the account’s
balance or value;126 and (3) a transaction history of the account.127
The foreign financial institutions submitting this information will
almost always be larger depository institutions that hold accounts not
just for U.S. persons but also likely for local clients.128 The
institutions submitting FATCA information will thus almost always
be centralized intermediaries.
This is especially true for countries with which the Treasury has
signed an intergovernmental agreement. For these jurisdictions, the
foreign financial institutions will first report the relevant FATCA
information to their local tax authorities.129 Then, pursuant to an
existing tax treaty or agreement, tax authorities in the foreign country
will automatically exchange the information with the IRS.130 The
intergovernmental agreement effectively makes the tax authority of
the foreign country itself the reporting entity.131 Such an obligation
unequivocally puts the burden of compliance on a centralized
intermediary, namely, the government of a foreign country.
6. Consumer Transactions
Notably absent from information reporting requirements are
consumer transactions, which involve amounts paid in furtherance of
personal consumption, rather than a trade or business.132 Even though
these transactions represent a large percentage of the total amount of
the underreporting tax gap, any statutory scheme for reporting these
payments would generally obligate individuals rather than

125. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)(A).
126. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)(B)-(C).
127. I.R.C. § 1471(c)(1)(D).
128. Treas. Reg. § 1.1471-5(e)(2) (2013). The definition of a foreign financial institution is extremely
broad and includes any institution that accepts deposits in the ordinary course of a banking or similar
business or holds, as a substantial portion of its business, financial assets for the benefit of one or more
other persons. Id.
129. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, supra note 63.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. IRS, supra note 10, at 10.
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institutions.133 Although such a reporting scheme would, if adhered
to, greatly improve tax compliance, imposing reporting obligations
on individual consumers has not been seriously contemplated.134
Even if some financial incentive existed for the payor in a consumer
transaction to report the payment, the potential relationship between
the parties could still easily result in a lack of reporting. Even
between parties with no previous relationship, a negotiated, mutually
tax-beneficial payment structure is not uncommon.135 Given that
enforcement of information reporting for consumer transactions is
administratively problematic and not a priority for the IRS,136
Congress has implicitly conceded that the most effective information
reporting regimes are those that obligate large, centralized payors.137
These reporters are both easily scrutinized and have a business
infrastructure that facilitates the reporting.138
In short, the bulk of the U.S. federal tax gap (both domestically
and internationally) is due to underreporting. Information reports
submitted on a given source of income or for other items (such as
overseas assets) that permit the IRS to determine which taxpayers are
evading taxes significantly reduce the likelihood of income
underreporting. However, current law governing the submission of
information reports implicitly acknowledges that centralized
intermediaries can most easily file the required information, despite
the fact that smaller, less centralized payors are the largest
contributors to the tax gap.

133. Another approach to incentivizing the reporting of these payments is to provide something of
value to the consumer in exchange for reporting the transactions. See Lederman, Reducing the Tax Gap,
supra note 29, at 1753 (“A creative alternative used in some countries is to have consumers’ receipts
double as lottery tickets.”).
134. See H.R. REP. NO. 112-15, at 4 (2011) (“[T]he Committee is concerned that the expansion of the
information reporting requirements imposes a substantial tax compliance burden on small businesses.”).
135. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Doing the Right Thing by Paying the Nanny Tax, N.Y. TIMES, (Jan. 23,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/24/your-money/taxes/24money.html?mcubz=3.
136. Bankman, supra note 88 and accompanying text.
137. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1737–42.
138. Id. at 1740.
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E. The Role of Centralized Intermediaries in Effective
Information Reporting
The preceding Section showed that the statutory and regulatory
framework of information reporting, both domestically and
internationally, relies heavily on centralized, third-party
intermediaries to provide information reports to the IRS. Once the
IRS has the information contained within the information reports, it
has a straightforward mechanism to quickly determine
noncompliance and assess deficiencies.139 For income items subject
to substantial reporting requirements, not only does the IRS have the
information previously known only to the reporting intermediary and
the taxpayer, but the taxpayer also knows that the IRS now has this
information, thus increasing the likelihood of taxpayer compliance
from the outset.140
But simply enacting statutes to address the payments that currently
go unreported will not solve the issue of underreporting. Congress
could enact statutes and the IRS could promulgate regulations
requiring the payors contributing the most to the tax gap to report
their payments, but such statutes and regulations would largely be
toothless.141 In general, these intermediaries report their payments of
income because the benefit to them—either in the form of
minimizing risk from penalties or obtaining a tax benefit from their
139. Data Book 2015, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK, Oct. 1, 2014–Sept. 30, 2015, at 38
(IRS, Wash. D.C.), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf. The IRS’ first pass at enforcement is
of minimal cost and done via its Automated Underreporter and Automated Substitute for Returns
programs, systems through which third-party information returns are used to automatically identify
unreported income and calculate tax return delinquencies. See also IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE
MANUALS, § 4.19.2.1 (2016) (describing procedure by which Automated Underreporter cases are
processed); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 200211040 (Jan. 30, 2002).
140. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1738–39 (“What likely makes
information reporting so successful in spurring compliance in the first instance is that, like ‘red light
cameras’ that snap pictures of vehicles failing to stop for a red light, the taxpayer is aware that the
government is watching.”)
141. Even extremely punitive penalties might not be sufficient to compel compliance if the perceived
risk is low. The penalties associated with FBAR noncompliance were severe, but did not alter the
perception that FBAR did little, even with the additional penalties, to promote tax compliance. See
supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. In addition, extremely punitive penalties in the tax content
can be politically challenging to enact.
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own recordkeeping—outweighs the costs of submitting returns.142 As
described below, there are criteria by which to evaluate the success of
proposed information reporting schemes. These criteria all favor,
either implicitly or explicitly, information reporting protocols that
obligate large, centralized third-party intermediaries over payors that
are more diffuse and distributed.
Not all information reporters are created equal. Leandra Lederman
has identified six factors to assess the success of information
reporting protocols.143 Though not exhaustive, these criteria provide a
framework to evaluate any information reporting scheme.144 The
factors include the extent to which (1) the reporting intermediary and
the taxpayer are engaging in arm’s length transactions; (2) a reporting
intermediary has a bookkeeping infrastructure in place; (3)
information reporting is concentrated; (4) the information reports
filed by the intermediary constitute complete reporting; (5) the
taxpayer has few alternatives other than to use the reporting
intermediary; and (6) the stakes of noncompliance are significant.145
Assuming the stakes of noncompliance are significant, all other
factors, either directly or implicitly, favor using large (relative to the
taxpayer), centralized third-party intermediaries as information
reporters.146
1. Arms-Length Transactions
An arm’s-length transaction is one where each of the parties acts
independently to further its own economic interests.147 A party to a
transaction not acting at arm’s length will potentially take into
account the counterparty’s economic interests, even if such action

142. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1737.
143. Id. at 1739–40.
144. Id. at 1739.
145. Id. at 1739–41.
146. See id. at 1753–54.
147. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(b)(1) (2009); Kevin K. Leung, Taxing Global Trading: An
Appropriate Testing Ground for Formula Apportionment?, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 201, 203–04
(1992).
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does not result in its own economic gain.148 An uncle might not, for
example, submit a required Form 1099 for his payee niece. If her tax
savings have some value to him, his risk of audit may be worth her
tax savings. In contrast, large, centralized intermediaries are less
likely to accept risk and share in the tax savings of their payees.149
This is especially true for publicly traded companies whose corporate
actions are subject to disclosure rules and heightened public
scrutiny.150 The consequences of engaging in transactions that are not
arms-length are higher for larger institutions; as a result, large thirdparty intermediaries are less likely to engage in transactions that are
not arm’s-length.151
2. Bookkeeping Infrastructure
A reporting intermediary with a bookkeeping infrastructure in
place can more easily track accounts payable, and can therefore more
easily track payments with reporting obligations.152 With an extant
bookkeeping infrastructure, the costs of reporting compliance
necessarily decrease, making reporting less burdensome.153 The
larger the reporting intermediary, the more likely the intermediary
has such a cost-saving bookkeeping infrastructure in place.154 As the
size of an intermediary increases, the costs associated with
bookkeeping generally represent a decreasing proportion of an
entity’s overall expenses.155 The marginal cost for a large
intermediary to produce each additional information return is likely
negligible.156

148. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1739.
149. Id. at n.25.
150. Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 29, at 730–31.
151. See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1743.
152. Id. at 1740.
153. See id. at 1739 n.26.
154. See id. at 1740.
155. Soled, supra note 79, at 376 (“[T]he information return issuer so regularly and frequently
encounters a particular situation that, unlike the individual taxpayer, it develops a unique expertise to
distill and disseminate this information.”).
156. Id. at 393.
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3. Concentration of Information Reporting157
When reporting obligations are concentrated amongst fewer payors
(relative to the payees), information reporting is more effective.
Large, centralized intermediaries typically outnumber the taxpayers
about whom information returns are filed.158 These third parties are
repeat players in the areas in which they do business, either as
employers (with respect to wage reporting) or as payors for goods
and or services.159 Although it is mathematically possible for the
number of income payors to exceed the number of payees within a
given industry, such a result is highly unlikely.160 Any large
intermediary responsible for filing information returns will likely
submit returns for a significant number of taxpayers.
4. Complete Reporting
Information reporting is most effective when the amounts
submitted by the reporter permit the IRS to determine what amount
should be included in the taxpayer’s gross income.161 For example,
information reporting on interest paid is more complete than
reporting only the gross proceeds (and not also the basis) from the
sale of an asset.162 The larger the reporting intermediary, the more
likely the intermediary has access to the information needed to
submit a complete information report.163 For example, a large,
established securities broker will likely be involved in both the
purchase and sale of the transacted security, permitting the broker to
completely report on the transaction.
157. Professor Lederman describes this factor as “centralization”; however, to avoid conflating her
definition with how the term “centralized” is used elsewhere in this Article, I have described this factor
as “concentration of information reporting.” Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at
1740 (“Information reporting is more efficient when required of parties who are fewer in number than
the recipients of the reports.”).
158. Id. at 1740 n.27.
159. See id. at 1737–38.
160. Id. at 1740 (“[B]usinesses tend to be fewer in number than their customers or employees.”).
161. See id.
162. See id. at 1738.
163. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1740.
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Another element of complete reporting relates to the degree to
which the reporter-submitted information corresponds to a line item
that can be easily checked against the payee’s return. As an
intermediary who is required to submit information returns grows in
size, it will submit an increasing number of information returns and
an increasing amount of income in total. If some triggering
criterion—be it an actual bright-line trigger or simply a punitive
enforcement trigger (like an audit)—exists to obligate the
intermediary to report, this triggering criterion is more frequently
implicated if the intermediary is a larger institution.164 As such, the
larger the intermediaries doing the reporting, the greater the
likelihood that the amounts being reported represent a complete
account of the amounts to be reported by the taxpayers.165 For
example, an employer with a single employee might pay this single
employee off the books. But as the employer grows in size, the risk
associated with noncompliance increases, and the employer is
incentivized to properly report its employee’s wages.
5. Few Alternative Arrangements
Information reporting will be less effective if the taxpayer can
easily avoid it by engaging in an alternative, equivalent transaction
not subject to information reporting.166 Taxpayers would enjoy
having the option, rather than the obligation, to report income. That
is, all things being equal, taxpayers would prefer an identical
relationship without the intermediary filing the required information
returns.167 But due to barriers to market entry, taxpayers receiving
payments from large, centralized intermediaries often have few
alternative options that are not also large and centralized.168 Financial
institutions, for example, are regulated in areas such as capital and
164. Id. at 1738 n.18.
165. Id. at 1740.
166. See id.
167. James Alm, A Perspective on the Experimental Analysis of Taxpayer Reporting, 66 ACCT. REV.
577, 577–78 (1991).
168. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1756.
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reserve requirements, corporate governance, and licensing standards
to reduce systemic risk.169 With regard to gambling, a “mom and
pop” betting parlor might offer a more favorable point spread than a
casino, but the required licensing restricts their ability to find
customers.170
Additionally, taxpayers choose to use centralized intermediaries
because the transaction costs with the centralized intermediary can be
lower than those with a decentralized intermediary.171 Large,
centralized intermediaries are providing a value to the taxpayers to
whom they make payments and on whom they are reporting.172
Again, without this value, all things being equal, taxpayers would
generally prefer an identical relationship without the intermediary
filing the required information returns. But any large, centralized
intermediary, by virtue of the stakes at risk for failure to comply with
the law, will be motivated to file information returns appropriately.173
For example, the market for paying workers off-the-books is not
strong enough to incentivize most W-2 recipients to seek under-thetable employment from their large employers who employ dozens of
others.174 Even outside the wage context, the advantages of
transacting with large, centralized intermediaries often outweigh the
costs associated with receiving an information return and paying
taxes on the reported income.175 For example, although an
unregulated individual or entity might pay a taxpayer at higher
interest rates, the decreased risk associated with using a large bank
does not preclude depositing money with a large depositary financial
169. Kristin Johnson, Steven Ramirez & Cary Martin Shelby, Diversifying to Mitigate Risk: Can
Dodd-Frank Section 342 Help Stabilize the Financial Sector?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1795, 1798
(2016).
170. See generally NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 463.160 (West 2013) (discussing licenses required for
Nevada sports books).
171. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1753–54.
172. Id.
173. Alm, supra note 167, at 577.
174. See Bankman, supra note 75, at 13.
175. See, e.g., S. POVERTY LAW CTR., UNDER SIEGE: LIFE FOR LOW-INCOME LATINOS IN THE SOUTH
25 (2009) (undocumented immigrants getting paid in cash are vulnerable to robbery); Liz Robbins, New
Weapon in Day Laborer’s Fight Against Wage Theft: A Smartphone App, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2006)
(describing wage theft for day laborers).
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institution. Large, centralized intermediaries can provide value in the
form of risk mitigation, services, rates of return, et cetera, that
smaller intermediaries lack the economy of scale to deliver.176 The
value provided to payees doing business with large, centralized
intermediaries compensates for any tax savings a payee might obtain
by transacting with a smaller, non-reporting intermediary.
Current law implicitly acknowledges that the only practical
information reporting protocols are those that obligate centralized
intermediaries.177 Scholarship on the factors by which information
reporting protocols should be assessed confirms that a successful
information reporting scheme is one in which centralized
intermediaries are responsible for submitting information reports.178
Our current law relies on centralized intermediaries, and the factors
described above show that this reliance is well-placed. But how
should an information reporting scheme operate when there is a
paucity of centralized intermediaries to obligate?
II. Ensuring Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy
In a decentralizing economy, transactions occur without the need
for the centralized intermediaries that currently provide the
information reporting integral to enforcing tax compliance.179 What
approaches can Congress and the IRS take to ensure this income is
appropriately taxed?
To the extent that information reporting protocols do not
accurately capture income, these standards should be modified.180
Changes to these standards have the potential to change compliance
costs, but the prevalence of electronic accounting would likely make
these increased compliance costs relatively minor.181
176. See THE CLEARING HOUSE, UNDERSTANDING THE ECONOMICS OF LARGE BANKS 13–16 (2011).
177. See Cheng, supra note 67, at 666.
178. Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1739–41.
179. See Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 990–92 (discussing the regulatory challenges emerging as a
result of “peer-to-peer consumption”).
180. See infra notes 198–209 and accompanying text.
181. Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 1012–13.
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The IRS could also work in conjunction with state and local
governments to share information that has direct relevance to federal
tax enforcement efforts. For example, San Francisco law requires
Airbnb hosts to report reservation information to city authorities.182
Knowing the IRS has this information could motivate these taxpayers
to report this income.
The following Section describes two technological shifts that have
the potential to decentralize the economy, and the responses
Congress and the IRS could take to ensure that income from these
transactions is appropriately taxed.
A. Technological Shifts Toward Economic Decentralization
New technologies have altered the paradigm by which suppliers of
labor and owners of capital bring their services and goods to the
marketplace. This Section focuses on two increasingly relevant
technological developments that shift payments from traditional,
centralized intermediaries to alternative payors outside the current
regulatory ambit of the IRS: (1) the sharing economy and (2) the
blockchain—a secure, distributed method of recordkeeping.
1. The Sharing Economy and Tax Compliance
The sharing economy, also known as the “on-demand platform” or
“gig” economy, is a broad term used to describe a system in which
underutilized assets or labor supplies are matched with a
consumer.183 The provider-consumer matching is done via a third
party that typically takes a small percentage of the sale price as a fee

182. See S.F. OFF. OF SHORT-TERM RENTALS, https://shorttermrentals.sfgov.org/ (last visited Aug. 31,
2017) (describing reporting obligations of Airbnb hosts).
183. Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 990–91; Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing
Economy As an Alternative Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 253–54 (2015); The Rise of the
Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), https://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-economy; Sarah Jaffe, Silicon Valley’s Gig Economy Is Not the
Future of Work—It’s Driving Down Wages, GUARDIAN (July 23, 2013, 6:45 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/23/gig-economy-silicon-valley-taskrabbitworkers.
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for coordinating the transaction.184 The provider of the assets or labor
is typically (though not always) a limited participant in the market,
with the third-party company seldom using its own employees to
engage directly with customers.185 Commonly available goods and
services of the sharing economy include ride-sharing (Uber and
Lyft), accommodations (Airbnb), delivery services (Instacart,
Postmates, and Seamless), and the provision of miscellaneous
services (TaskRabbit).186
There is evidence that workers are increasingly using the ondemand economy to supplement traditional methods of earning
wages187 while also shifting transactions away from more traditional
businesses.188 It is estimated that the number of Americans working
in the sharing economy will double to more than 6.4 million by
2020.189 Individuals working on the labor side of the on-demand
economy do not typically use these earnings as their primary source
of income, but rather as a supplement to other sources of pay.190 A
typical monthly income in the on-demand economy represents
approximately 20% to 30% of total income, or about $300 to $500 in
absolute terms.191

184. Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 997–98. Airbnb, a company connecting hosts with available
housing with guests in search of housing, charges hosts 3% of the reservation fee and charges guests
between
6%
to
12%.
What
Are
Airbnb
Service
Fees?,
AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/104/what-are-guest-service-fees (last visited Aug. 31, 2017).
185. See BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 8. Many sharing companies classify their workers as
independent contractors. See id. at 9.
186. Id. at 1. This list is by no means exhaustive. There are dozens of other companies that could
conceivably be categorized as participating in the sharing economy. Id.
187. Id. at 2.
188. Georgios Zervas, Davide Proserpio, & John W. Byers., The Rise of the Sharing Economy:
Estimating the Impact of Airbnb on the Hotel Industry, J. MARKETING RES. (Oct. 2017) (finding hotel
revenues decreased by up to 10% in certain markets due to Airbnb); Thor Berger, Chinchih Chen, &
Carl Benedikt Frey, Drivers of Disruption? Estimating the Uber Effect, OXFORD MARTIN SCH. 1 (2017)
(finding decline in wages earned by taxi drivers due to Uber).
189. BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 4.
190. Id. at 5. Providers of labor include Uber drivers and TaskRabbit workers. Id. Airbnb is an
example of capital platform; i.e., the monetization of an asset held by the payee of the on-demand
economy. DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST, PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS,
AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY 5 (2016).
191. BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 5; FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 190, at 5.
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Most earnings from the on-demand economy are characterized as
something other than Form W-2 wages.192 In part, this is because
payors have an incentive to classify workers as independent
contractors rather than employees: classification as an employee
triggers increased employment tax obligations to employers.193 Many
companies working in the labor sector of the sharing economy,
however, disclaim both employee and independent contractor
relationships with the payees to whom an information reporting
obligation would typically exist.194 For these payees, many sharing
companies have claimed status as a third-party settlement
organization obligated to report payments only when the total
number of transactions to a given payee is greater than 200 and the
total dollar amount exceeds $20,000.195
a. Underreporting Issues of the Sharing Economy
The acceptance of the sharing economy has resulted in taxpayers
earning income in ways outside of the traditional employer-employee
context. By renting out rooms in their homes on a short-term basis or
using their personal car to transport paying passengers, these
taxpayers can earn income that is generally not treated as wages by
the companies from whom they are receiving payments. Instead of
having income reported on Form W-2 or a Form 1099-MISC, payors
characterize many of these payments as payments from “third party
settlement organizations,” which are only reported on a Form 1099-K
if certain, fairly lax threshold requirements are satisfied.196
192. BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 9.
193. See generally IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 3908, GAMING TAX LAW AND BANK
SECRECY ACT ISSUES 14 (2013) (discussing payroll tax obligations).
194. See, e.g., Mike Isaac, Judge Overturns Uber’s Settlement with Its Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/19/technology/uber-settlement-californiadrivers.html?mcubz=3&_r=0 (discussing California lawsuit litigating classification of Uber workers as
independent contractors).
195. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6041-3 (2013); see also Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 1032–33; Erik J.
Christenson & Amanda T. Kottke, Guidance Needed to Clarify Reporting Obligations for Online
Marketplaces and Peer-to-Peer Platforms, TAX MGMT. MEMORANDUM, at *6 (2014); supra note 63 and
accompanying text.
196. See Christenson & Kottke, supra note 195, at *5.
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Companies sending workers Form 1099-K (rather than a W-2 or
Form 1099-MISC) include Airbnb, Etsy, Lyft, and TaskRabbit.197
Most payments made to sharing economy participants are not
reported because of the higher thresholds associated with Form 1099K.198 Workers benefit to the extent this income goes untaxed and
undetected by the IRS, and sharing economy companies also have an
incentive to not submit information returns on this income. By
paying these workers an untaxed income, the amount that sharing
economy companies must pay workers to properly incentivize their
participation is lower than what they would otherwise need to pay if
workers included these payments in their gross income. As a result,
this somewhat lax reporting threshold benefits not only the worker,
but sharing economy companies as well.
Given that many companies in the on-demand sector are privately
held,199 it is difficult to precisely determine amounts paid to their
workers and the amount of income these companies are not reporting
to the IRS. One estimate of Airbnb’s revenue from 2015 was
approximately $1 billion.200 Given that Airbnb has seen annual
revenue increases of greater than 80%,201 a conservative estimate for
their current annual revenue is $2 billion. This revenue represents 6%
to 12% of the total amount collected from guests and, consequently,
paid to hosts.202 As such, there is approximately $20 billion of
revenue paid to hosts, the bulk of whom likely do not receive a Form
1099-K.203 Even if hosts might otherwise reach the threshold limits
of $20,000 and 200 reservations, it is simple to use multiple accounts
197. BRUCKNER, supra note 6, at 2, 3, 9.
198. Id. at 15–16. 61% of those surveyed receiving income from a sharing economy company did not
receive a Form 1099. Id. at 15.
199. Riley McDermid, Airbnb Rakes in $850 Million in Funding, Raises Value to $30 Billion, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016, 10:12 AM), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/blog/realestate/2016/08/airbnb-valued-at-30-billion-hospitality-tourism.html.
200. Rolfe Winkler & Douglas Macmillan, The Secret Math of Airbnb’s $24 Billion Valuation, WALL
STREET J. (June 17, 2015, 3:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-secret-math-of-airbnbs-24-billionvaluation-1434568517.
201. Id.
202. Id. Airbnb charges guests 6% to 12% of the cost of booking. Id.
203. Using an average service fee rate of 9%, the total amount paid to hosts equals $2 billion. When
divided by 0.09 times 0.91, this equals $20.2 billion.
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to ensure a Form 1099-K is not received. As a result, payors do not
report several billion dollars to the IRS, and most of that is likely
unreported by taxpayers.204
But the compliance issues associated with this underreported
income are well within the power of Congress to correct. Although a
shift from traditional employer to alternative income sources has
occurred, there still exist centralized intermediaries on which
information reporting obligations can be imposed. There are simple
solutions to more adequately regulate the companies responsible for
developing the infrastructure allowing payors to obtain this
alternative revenue stream. Airbnb, Lyft, TaskRabbit, and Etsy
(among others) do not currently issue any information reports to
payors unless an individual payor receives $20,000 and more than
200 transactions, a threshold not reached by many income earners.205
But these companies are large, established companies (i.e.,
centralized intermediaries) on which reporting obligations can easily
be imposed. Although specific questions remain regarding the
characterization of some of these payments from company to
worker,206 Congress can and should lower the information reporting
thresholds to easily capture income that is currently going
unreported.
2. The Decentralizing Potential of Blockchain Technology
In contrast to the current state of the on-demand sharing economy,
blockchain technology permits true decentralization, wherein
taxpayers receive value transfers not from a centralized intermediary
204. See David Kocieniewski, Airbnb, Others Pay Out Billions Beneath IRS’s Radar, BLOOMBERG
TECH. (May 24, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-23/airbnbothers-pay-out-billions-beneath-irs-s-radar-study-finds (citing study finding “that billions of dollars in
taxable income a year are probably going unreported every year”).
205. Oei & Ring, supra note 123, at 1035, 1037. Uber, on the other hand, issues 1099-Ks to all
drivers earning more than $600. See generally Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig Economy, U.
PA. L. REV. (forthcoming).
206. Isaac, supra note 194. The distinction between wage income and independent contract payments
remains an issue for drivers working for Uber, for example. See id. (“The drivers first sued Uber in
2013, claiming that they should have been classified as employees rather than independent contractors
of the company.”).
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but from peers within a secure, distributed network operating
independently of any governing authority.207
a. Overview of Blockchain Technology
Blockchain technology came to public attention in a paper
published by Satoshi Nakamoto outlining a purely electronic
payment system known as Bitcoin.208 Whereas traditional electronic
transactions require clearance by some trusted third-party financial
institution, the payment infrastructure imagined by Nakamoto
distributes the burdens of verification to the network at large, relying
on all participants to maintain the integrity of the network’s whole.209
All participants of the network maintain a copy of the entire
transactional ledger, with additions to the ledger made only after a
critical mass of participants verify the legitimacy of the
transaction.210 Any attempt to corrupt the publicly maintained ledger
would require a near simultaneous corruption of a majority of the
systems running the blockchain application, a feat whose difficulty
safeguards the security of the network.211 The security of the network
is maintained not by trusting the other network participants but by
each network participant acting in its own self-interest.
Despite the fact that all network participants maintain a complete
record of the transactional ledger, transactions between network
207. ACCENTURE, BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY: PREPARING FOR CHANGE *2 (2015),
https://www.accenture.com/us-en/~/media/Accenture/next-gen/top-tenchallenges/challenge4/pdfs/Accenture-2016-Top-10-Challenges-04-Blockchain-Technology.pdf.
208. Satoshi Nakamoto, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System 1 (Oct. 31, 2008) (unpublished white
paper) (available at https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf).
209. See id. at 1, 5.
210. Lance Koonce, The Wild, Distributed World: Get Ready for Radical Infrastructure Changes,
from Blockchains to the Interplanetary File System to the Internet of Things, 28 INTELL. PROP. & TECH.
L.J. 3, at *2 (2016) (“Transactions facilitated by blockchain technology are verified automatically by a
multitude of computers, and the transactions are recorded in a digital ledger that exists on all of those
computers simultaneously.”). Verification of a transaction’s legitimacy is done by solving a
computationally intensive math problem, with the solution broadcast to the network and confirmed by
other network participants. Id.
211. The mathematics undergirding the cryptographic security of the blockchain system is beyond the
scope of this article. See Michael Crosby, et al., Blockchain Technology: Beyond Bitcoin, APPLIED
INNOVATION REV. 6, 11–13 (2016) (providing overview of blockchain technology and mathematics).
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participants can have a high level of anonymity. Transactions occur
between addresses, and each network participant is entitled to an
unlimited number of addresses.212 The public can see that two
addresses are transacting but will not know the identities of the
addresses’ owners.213 Who controls individual addresses is unknown
to the public, but the content that passes between addresses is known
to all.214
Although Bitcoin is the most well-known application of the
blockchain, it is but one specific use of the general blockchain
technology. Other applications using blockchain technologies include
Ethereum, Ripple, and Litecoin, to name just a few.215 The aggregate
value of cryptocurrencies is significant; one current estimate places
the market capitalization of all cryptocurrencies at greater than $100
billion.216
For any network in which participants currently rely on a trusted
third party (such as a bank) to confirm the legitimacy of transactions,
blockchain technology has the potential to eliminate the need for the
centralized
intermediary
providing
the
verification.217
Cryptocurrency payments represent a simple instantiation of
blockchain technology: person A wishes to transfer X Bitcoins to
person B, and person B wants to receive X Bitcoins from person A.
The criteria for which value transfers occur, however, need not be so
simple.
For value transfers where the criteria for the transfer are objective,
blockchain applications can add increasing levels of complexity
beyond transfers of cryptocurrency. These so-called “smart
contracts” replicate commercial contracts and validate the parties’

212. See Nakamoto, supra note 208, at 8.
213. Id. at 6.
214. Id.
215. Tara Mandjee, Bitcoin, Its Legal Classification and Its Regulatory Framework, 15 J. BUS. &
SEC. L. 157, 160 (2015).
216. Denise Lugo, Auditing in Blockchain Waters Bring Uncharted Challenges, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at 1 (June 26, 2017).
217. See Mandjee, supra note 215, at 170.
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performances through the decentralized blockchain.218 Consider two
persons wishing to bet against one another on the outcome of a
sporting event. Traditionally, these parties must either place their
wager with a reliable counterparty (say, a casino) or trust that the
losing party will pay.219 Collecting on the winning bet would require
physically cashing in a winning ticket at the casino or finding the
counterparty and collecting the funds.220 This transaction can easily
be regulated since casinos are large, centralized intermediaries.
In contrast, by using blockchain technology, the entire wagering
transaction can be automated without relying on either a third-party
intermediary or the integrity of the counterparty. Each party would
simply move their wager to an address that functions as an escrow
account. The escrow address can be programmed to release its
contents to the winning party once the sporting event concludes and
the results are known. This relies on the smart contract having a
verifiable data stream from which to draw the results.221 Attempting
to defraud the escrow account would require a majority of the users
of the entire blockchain to confirm that the outcome of the sporting
event is contrary to reality, a scale of fraud unlikely to be successful.
b. The Effect of Blockchain Technology on Tax Enforcement
As discussed earlier, centralized intermediaries add value by
providing their customers with risk mitigation and economies of
218. ACCENTURE, supra note 207 (describing applications of the blockchain technology); see also
TIM SWANSON, GREAT CHAIN OF NUMBERS: A GUIDE TO SMART CONTRACTS, SMART PROPERTY, AND
TRUSTLESS ASSET MANAGEMENT 16 (2014). Use of “smart contracts” is not limited to transactions
involving just two parties. Any combination of conditional events can be programmed amongst several
parties, provided the contingencies are clearly defined as amenable to objective validation. Id.
219. Although casinos often are exposed to some risk when accepting wagers, they typically mitigate
this by accepting equal (or as close as possible to equal) amounts of wagers on either side. See Christine
Hurt, Regulating Public Morals and Private Markets: Online Securities Trading, Internet Gambling,
and the Speculation Paradox, 86 B.U. L. REV. 371, 419 (2006) (“If the bookie is setting the line at
equilibrium, then the bookie makes money whether bettors win or lose.”).
220. See id. at 416. If gambling winnings exceed certain thresholds, winners receive Form W-2G.
About Form W-2G, Certain Gambling Winnings, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/forms-pubs/about-form-w2g
(last updated Aug. 27, 2017).
221. A reliable data stream is any trusted source for data such as stock prices, sports scores, the
weather, et cetera.
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scale.222 As a consequence of their centrality as payors of income,
Congress and the IRS have placed the bulk of reporting obligations
on these entities, recognizing that to impose these obligations on
other parties would be far less successful.223 But applications of
blockchain technology have the potential to offer the value provided
by these centralized intermediaries without being subject to any
information reporting requirements. In other words, savvy taxpayers
could use blockchain applications to effectuate the previously
discussed “alternative arrangements” that undermine the
effectiveness of information reporting.224
Some income sources are not likely to shift from their existing
centralized payors to the blockchain. For instance, the relationship
between wage earner and employer is one that cannot be effectively
duplicated via a decentralized technology.225 Anonymity is not
possible with most effective employer-employee relationships.
Blockchain applications are most helpful for parties acting at a
distance when effectuating transfers that are contingent upon
verifiable, objective criteria. Employees and employers have an
ongoing affiliation that requires frequent interaction. As a result,
blockchain technology will not likely increase the low rates of
noncompliance for the reporting of wage income.226
Though wage income is not likely to move to a blockchain
application, other sizable income sources are contenders for this shift.
Any income derived from investments where the value of the
investments is ascertainable from an easily verifiable data source has
the potential to move away from regulated exchanges and onto the
blockchain.227 A blockchain trader would theoretically be able to
purchase a synthetic share of stock (assuming a willing, selling
counterparty) and mimic the economic return on an identical equity

222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1740 n.27.
Id. at 1756 n.122.
See supra notes166–175 and accompanying text.
See Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps, supra note 29, at 1740 n.31.
Id.
See Mandjee, supra note 215, at 185.
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investment.228 According to IRS data, several of the largest income
sources in the United States (outside of wages) are from the return on
investments, including the sale of capital assets ($716 billion) and
income from pensions and annuities ($663 billion).229 Although more
specifics on the assets comprising this income are not available, to
the extent these sales consist of sales of financial products that can be
emulated using blockchain technology, they risk going unreported.
Moving transactions away from the centralized intermediaries of
regulated exchanges and brokerage houses and onto decentralized
platforms would result in dramatically reduced information reporting
oversight.230 For example, Form 1099-B, as discussed earlier, is
required to be submitted by brokers acting as middlemen (for
consideration) with respect to property or services.231 Of the 2.3
billion information returns submitted in 2014, approximately 1.1
billion, or 49%, were 1099-Bs.232 Brokers buying and selling
products on these exchanges on behalf of customers typically require
licensure and must pass various certification tests.233 Customers
using brokers to obtain products on these exchanges benefit from
standardization with regard to products purchased and other
regulatory safeguards.234 To the extent a smart contract could be
drafted to provide the standardization and regulatory oversight that
currently exist on exchanges, transactions in derivatives (and the

228. This assumes the selling counterparty is obligated, via the smart contract, to make the
appropriate margin calls. Additionally, the owner of such a synthetic equity would not have voting
rights.
229. In 2014, wage income comprised $6.8 trillion (69%) of the $9.9 trillion of income reported by all
taxpayers. IRS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 1304, SOI TAX STATS–INDIVIDUAL INCOME
TAX RETURNS at tbl.1.3 (2014).
230. Regulated futures contracts, for example, are traded on exchanges such as the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange & Chicago Board of Trade. See also I.R.C. § 1256 (2012).
231. I.R.C. § 6045(a), (c) (2012). See supra notes 111–116 and accompanying text.
232. I.R.C. § 6045(c)(1).
233. See, e.g., MELINDA H. SCHRAMM, CME GROUP, THE COMPLETE IB HANDBOOK 41 (2016). To
trade on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange a commodity broker “must pass a Series 3 examination, be
licensed by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission and be a member of the National Futures
Association.” Id.
234. Id. at 41.
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attendant information reporting) could easily evade regulatory
oversight.235
Consider a regulated futures contract, which by definition is traded
on an exchange registered with either the SEC or the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission.236 Gains and losses associated with a
regulated futures contract would be reported on Form 1099-B, as
discussed previously.237 Although a taxpayer might not have reported
the associated gain otherwise, trading on a registered exchange gives
the trader assurance that certain safeguards are met.238 Such
safeguards include requiring market participants to maintain margin
requirements, suspending trading in an emergency, and preventing
market manipulation.239 A smart contract on a platform using
blockchain technology might be able to provide these same
safeguards, but without the centralized intermediary of the registered
exchange.240 As a result, the proceeds of the transaction would go
unreported and the gain potentially untaxed.241
Another potential source of future noncompliance is income
earned from pass-through entities. Even though this income source
includes income from sole proprietorships, an income source that is
already dramatically underreported,242 the potential of the blockchain
to function as a depositary institution opens the door to even more

235. Id. at 41–42. Trading in equities, in contrast, would likely still involve regulated exchanges,
given that rights of equity ownership (such as voting) would be lost if transferred via an anonymous
blockchain system. SWANSON, supra note 218, at 54.
236. I.R.C. §§ 1256(g)(1), 1256(g)(7).
237. See supra notes 27–28, 111–123 and accompanying text.
238. See 7 U.S.C. § 7(c)–(d)(1)(A), (d)(20) (2012) (setting forth requirements for a contract market to
be a “designated contract market” as defined by Commodity Futures Trading Commission).
239. 7 U.S.C. § 7(d)(20).
240. Theodore W. Reuter, Bitcoin’s Digital Enterprise Creates Alternative Business Transactions, 57
ADVOCATE 33, 34 (2014). The blockchain application combined with a smart contract could establish an
escrow function for margin calls and trigger automatic sale (or prohibition of sale) if the volatility of the
asset in question exceeds certain threshold values. Id. (“Because Bitcoin is a ledger rather than an
exchange of digital objects, the possibility exists for writing additional information into that ledger to
expand its application to different types of transactions.”).
241. See Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the Future of Financial
Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 232, 239 (2015) (describing potential disruptions to the
financial sector that blockchain technology could create).
242. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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noncompliance. Small business owners might currently report some
income in order to use local banking services or make investments.
The blockchain technology could provide this same value to small
business owners without the attendant pressure to report the income.
The risks of noncompliance due to blockchain technology are similar
to those associated with cash transactions, but with the ability to
transact with counterparties at a distance and without the risk of
storing and transporting large amounts of currency.
c. Sharing Economy Transactions Without a Corporate
Payor
Blockchain technology has the potential to replicate many
transactions currently occurring via sharing economy platforms.243
Currently, blockchain technology is primarily used to keep track of
financial payments between users, but a similar system could be used
to track and confirm many other forms of data, such as location.244 In
theory, blockchain technology could serve as a substitute for other
sharing economy companies, such as Uber.245 If these transactions
are facilitated without the existence of a corporate entity, the IRS has
no entity on which to impose reporting obligations. As such, the IRS
would need some other means of ensuring that payments of income
are being reported.
d. Blockchain Technology and International Tax Evasion
The potential of blockchain technology to evade international taxes
is especially troubling.246 A U.S. taxpayer living abroad could easily
use blockchain technology in a manner very similar to how taxpayers
243. See Nathaniel Popper & Steve Lohr, Blockchain: A Better Way to Track Pork Chops, Bonds, Bad
Peanut
Butter?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
4,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/business/dealbook/blockchain-ibm-bitcoin.html?mcubz=3.
244. Id.
245. See Swanson, supra note 218, at 69. Any decentralized version of Uber would necessarily lack
customer support but would provide the core services of rider transport and payment.
246. See generally Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?, 112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST
IMPRESSIONS 38, 42 (2013).

Published by Reading Room, 2018

43

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 1

326

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 34:2

used foreign accounts to evade taxes prior to FATCA.247 By
depositing funds in a cryptocurrency account, taxpayers could engage
in an endless number of transactions, with any gains going
unreported (and virtually undetectable) until those cryptocurrency
balances are converted into U.S. dollars, an event that may never
occur. Taxpayers based in the U.S. could use a similar approach to
evade taxes (removing the international component), but this would
require, at the very least, transmitting U.S. dollars to the blockchain
technology, which could receive some regulatory scrutiny.248
FATCA’s solution to the problem of international tax avoidance is
to impose reporting obligations on the foreign financial entities
holding the U.S. accounts in question.249 This approach is untenable
when attempting to prevent a tax avoidance scheme based on
blockchain technology because the operation of these applications
does not rely upon the existence of financial intermediaries and is out
of the regulatory reach of foreign governments.250 FATCA
incentivizes foreign financial institutions to disclose information on
U.S. taxpayers because adverse consequences are associated with
failure to comply.251 It is much more difficult to create adverse
financial consequences for any of the participants in a cryptocurrency
network.
e. Addressing the Information Reporting Gap Caused by the
Blockchain
Blockchain technologies have the potential to shift transactions
away from centralized, established third-party reporters to distributed
networks of payors, thereby undermining existing information
protocols.252 Rather than waiting until blockchain transactions
become a significant proportion of payments to taxpayers, Congress
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

See supra notes 52–68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 286–297 and accompanying text.
Marian, supra note 246, at 41.
See id. at 42.
Id. at 41.
See id. at 44.
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and the IRS should take proactive steps to prevent the erosion of the
reported income base. Two potential approaches include scrutinizing
the entry and exit points of blockchain systems, and incentivizing
participants to shed the anonymity provided by the technology.
i. Entry to and Exit from the Blockchain Technology
Participants in a cryptocurrency network can obtain
cryptocurrency by actively participating in the computationally
cumbersome calculations that confirm the legitimacy of transactions
between network participants.253 This process, known as mining,254 is
essential to ensuring network integrity. Identifying who is earning
cryptocurrency from mining is difficult, since these network
participants are earning cryptocurrency without providing a good or
service to any identifiable person.255
But even though the blockchain infrastructure is a distributed
platform allowing for endogenous anonymity, the entry and exit
points from the system have the potential to be regulated. The flow of
value within the system cannot be definitively allocated to known
network participants, but the deposit of funds into or extraction of
funds out of a blockchain network can potentially be monitored.256
Entry into the blockchain system by converting existing funds into
cryptocurrency is common.257 If funds are transmitted from a
traditional financial intermediary (say, a bank) for use in a
blockchain network, this centralized financial intermediary could be
253. Brad Jacobsen & Fred Peña, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Bitcoins, 27 UTAH B.J. 40,
40–41 (2014).
254. Id.
255. See id.
256. See Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook, Advancing A Framework for Regulating
Cryptocurrency Payments Intermediaries, 32 YALE J. ON REG. 495, 533–34 (2015) (describing methods
by which a Bitcoin transaction executor can be regulated).
257. See Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Price Soars, Fueled by Speculation and Global Currency Turmoil,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/03/business/dealbook/bitcoin-price-soarsfueled-by-speculation-and-global-currency-turmoil.html?mcubz=3 (“[P]reviously released Bitcoins can
be bought and sold on exchanges around the world.”). A network participant is permitted to set up
addresses without any seed funding and could be sent funds in exchange for providing goods or
services.
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required to collect identifying information that would incentivize the
network participant to report on any transactions resulting in taxable
gain.
This is most relevant for users wanting to convert traditional
currency into a cryptocurrency for use on a blockchain platform.
Some exchange between the seller and buyer of the cryptocurrency
must occur. If this exchange is facilitated by some third party, as
opposed to an all-cash, in-person transaction, this third party can be
the entity on which Congress and the IRS can turn their regulatory
focus. The same is true if the third party is a seller of goods and
services wishing to accept cryptocurrency as payment. If these sellers
are established entities, reporting rules could require them to collect
and submit information on the electronic “addresses” with which
they regularly transact.258
New York State adopted this approach when enacting its
framework for regulating Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies.259 This
statute, known as the BitLicense, requires anyone who engages in
“Virtual Currency Business Activity” to obtain a license, meet certain
capital requirements, maintain books and records, file financial
reports, and subject themselves to examination.260 Although the New
York regulation was enacted as a consumer protection statute
analogous to those governing money transmitters,261 similar
legislation enacted at the federal level could provide some minimum
oversight of network participants entering into or exiting the
blockchain.
This legislation could mimic the approach taken by the federal
government in regulating internet gambling in 2006. The Unlawful

258. See Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 256, at 522–23.
259. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 23, § 200.1 to -.22 (2015).
260. Hughes & Middlebrook, supra note 256, at 537; see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit.
23, § 200.1 to -.22 (2015).
261. John L. Douglas, New Wine into Old Bottles: Fintech Meets the Bank Regulatory World, 20 N.C.
BANKING INST. 17, 47 (2016) (“The BitLicense regime can be described as ‘money transmitter plus’
because, in addition to imposing requirements similar to those imposed by money transmitter regulation,
the BitLicense regime also imposes requirements tailored to the unique nature of the virtual currency
business.”).
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Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA)262 required
financial transaction providers to identify payments made to entities
involved with internet gambling.263 Notably, the legislation did not
explicitly ban the gambling itself. But by regulating financial
transaction providers (the centralized intermediaries), U.S.-based
gamblers were prevented from funding their offshore gambling
accounts.264 The same approach could be used when federally
regulating blockchain technologies. Transactions to entities
categorized as impermissibly anonymous blockchain platforms could
either be restricted or simply monitored by the institution effectuating
the transfer. As a result, the IRS would be on notice (and the taxpayer
would know that the IRS was on notice) about the taxpayer’s
involvement with the blockchain platform.
One limitation to this approach is that the reported amount may not
correspond to the amount the taxpayer is actually required to include
in her gross income.265 Given that a taxpayer could enter and exit the
blockchain platform using two different entities, obtaining complete
information on the taxpayer’s actual gain could be challenging.
Another concern is that monitoring the entry and exit points would
not provide any direct oversight of transactions occurring internally
to the blockchain system. Gain or loss from transactions with other
network participants would only be reported if the regulatory
oversight provided at the blockchain’s entry point reduced anonymity
to the extent that the public ledger’s secrecy was somewhat
compromised. Decreasing the incentive to remain anonymous,
discussed in the next Section, is another possible method by which
network participants could be motivated to accurately report relevant
gains and losses.
262. Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1886
(2006) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367 (2006)).
263. Charles P. Ciaccio, Jr., Internet Gambling: Recent Developments and State of the Law, 25
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 542 (2010).
264. Id. at 543 (“The UIGEA does not target Joe the Gambler; instead, it targets the flow of funds to
internet gambling operators.”).
265. See supra note 161 and accompanying text, discussing helpfulness of complete reporting on
information returns.
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The IRS has taken this approach in attempting to gain information
on the tax compliance of cryptocurrency users.266 Coinbase, the
largest United States cryptocurrency exchange, was issued a
summons by the IRS that would require Coinbase to produce records
for any users who conducted transactions in a cryptocurrency.267
Although the summons issued in this case is a John Doe summons,
wherein specific users need not be identified by the responding
party,268 the IRS could potentially use the information obtained from
the summons to determine which of the anonymous users are
potentially evading their income tax obligations. This could be done
simply by observing when cryptocurrency sales likely generated a
profit that was converted to dollars.269
ii. Incentivizing Transparency
Blockchain technology has a variety of uses beyond its ability to
facilitate high-value transactions anonymously.270 Existing financial
institutions have invested resources into proprietary blockchain
concepts intended to reduce clearing times and reduce recordkeeping
requirements.271 In the absence of anonymity, and in contrast to
current cash-settled transactions, the blockchain provides an exact
ledger of who has received what payments and when.272 Because all

266. See United States v. Coinbase, Inc., Case No. 17-cv-01431-JSC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 111756,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 28, 2017).
267. Allyson Versprille, Virtual Tax Reality: Four Issues Facing the Bitcoin World, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), at *2–*3 (July 11, 2017).
268. Cecelia Kehoe Dempsey, The Application of the John Doe Summons Procedure to the DualPurpose Investigatory Summons, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 574, 578 (1984).
269. The IRS currently treats cryptocurrencies as property, and not currency. See supra note 9 and
accompanying text.
270. See Nathaniel Popper, Central Banks Consider Bitcoin’s Technology, if Not Bitcoin, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/business/dealbook/central-banks-considerbitcoins-technology-if-not-bitcoin.html?mcubz=3.
271. ACCENTURE, supra note 207, at 4 (identifying blockchains as useful to investment banks in
reducing total cost of ownership, managing system-of-record sharing, clearing and settling transactions
faster, and creating self-describing electronic transactions). These blockchain technologies would not
pose significant hurdles to tax enforcement since the institutions behind their promulgation are large,
centralized intermediaries. Cheng, supra note 67, at 666.
272. ACCENTURE, supra note 207, at 4.
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network participants confirm the legitimacy of each transaction, the
ledger of all transactions is publicly available.273
For some network participants, anonymity is a secondary concern
relative to these other benefits.274 If these parties can be encouraged
to shed the anonymity provided by the blockchain, the anonymity of
the other parties is weakened.275 If a series of payments originate
from different addresses that are linked to a network user who has
voluntarily surrendered her anonymity, the destination of these
payments can be tracked more easily. Even if the payee has spread
the payment across several network addresses, the payor knows the
rationale for the series of payments. When even some users surrender
anonymity, regulatory bodies can more easily investigate the flow of
value transfer.
Surrendering anonymity can be incentivized by regulating network
participants whose business activities are too significant to
intentionally evade the reporting requirements that are already in
place. By requiring, say, the blockchain equivalent of Amazon to
levy an additional tax on all anonymous network participants with
whom they do business, parties for whom anonymity gives no value
will be motivated to surrender their anonymity.276 With some number
of network participants choosing transparency over anonymity, the
anonymity of the remaining participants becomes compromised,
potentially leaving solely the bad actors choosing anonymity.
Knowing some of the identities on the public ledger makes it easier
to determine to whom the unknown addresses on the public ledger
might belong. If, for example, a pool of one hundred users has one
bad actor, one good actor surrendering anonymity will not
significantly increase the bad actor’s risk of capture.277 But if all
ninety-nine good actors surrender anonymity, the bad actor will be
outed.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
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Incentivizing transparency has the added benefit of potentially
improving certain aspects of tax collection. Many of the world’s
largest banks are working together and investing in developing
blockchain technology for use in banking transactions.278 If these
centralized intermediaries incorporate blockchain technologies into
their already-existing businesses, it could make tax enforcement
much simpler.279 Consider a distributed ledger on which all financial
firms record and settle transactions. The IRS would need only to
determine which “addresses” were owned by a certain taxpayer in
order to fully construct a transaction history for that taxpayer.280
There are some blockchain applications for which anonymity is a
fundamental value. Zcash, a nascent virtual currency, uses advanced
cryptography to confirm the legitimacy of its transactions, but
without revealing, as Bitcoin does, the transaction history of its
users.281 Although users can voluntarily surrender anonymity if they
choose, this does not (in theory) increase the risk that the Zcash
participants choosing to retain anonymity will be outed.282
B. The Shift Away from Cash Transactions
Not all technological shifts will reduce the IRS’s capacity for tax
enforcement. Businesses are increasingly moving away from cash
transactions and toward all-electronic payments.283 For the compliant
278. Trautman, supra note 241, at 239.
279. Id. at 232.
280. Outside of the income tax context, tax compliance benefits also exist for the collection of certain
consumption taxes. See Richard T. Ainsworth & Andrew B. Shact, Blockchain Technology Might Solve
VAT Fraud, 83 TAX NOTES INT’L 1165, 1167 (2016).
281. Nathaniel Popper, Zcash, a Harder-to-Trace Virtual Currency, Generates Price Frenzy, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/01/business/dealbook/zcash-a-harder-totrace-virtual-currency-generates-price-frenzy.html?mcubz=3.
282. Id.
283. Megan Woolhouse, No Cash Allowed: Stores Refusing to Accept Money, BOS. GLOBE (Aug. 4,
2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/08/03/paying-cash-some-stores-say-thanksgreenbacks-credit-only/a4EvjwgTpI7r4lD3xVOENO/story.html. Prior to banning cash in 2016,
Sweetgreen’s cash transactions declined to less than 10% of all transactions from 40% in 2007. Gloria
Dawson, At Sweetgreen, a Suitcase Full of Cash Won’t Buy You Lunch, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/31/business/where-a-suitcase-full-of-cash-wont-buy-youlunch.html?mcubz=3.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol34/iss2/1

50

Viswanathan: Tax Compliance in a Decentralizing Economy

2018]

TAX COMPLIANCE IN A DECENTRALIZING ECONOMY

333

taxpayer, the benefits of prohibiting cash transactions include
increased transaction speed, ease of accounting, and a decreased
security need.284 These benefits are increasingly worth the service
charges levied by credit card companies and other facilitators of
electronic transactions, so that in certain locations spending cash can
be challenging.285 The electronic record of transactions is itself not a
report of the taxpayer’s income, of course. But the IRS’s ability to
construct a complete transaction history of a taxpayer under audit
would likely be sufficient to incentivize the taxpayer to avoid willful
evasion. To the intentionally noncompliant taxpayer, however, the
move away from cash does not necessarily mandate full compliance.
Transacting in cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin, would potentially
give intentionally noncompliant taxpayers the benefits of going
cashless and provide a method by which to avoid reporting income.
CONCLUSION
Tax compliance in the United States relies in large part on
successful information reporting by both payors and other third
parties. Information reporting protocols are most successful when the
obligating statutes impose the burden of filing returns on centralized
intermediaries. These intermediaries exist because they provide value
to the customer/payee in the form of reduced risk or transactional
simplicity.
Emerging technology has the potential to render these centralized
intermediaries far less important. Congress and the IRS should
prepare for this eventuality and take steps to ensure that American
income remains correctly reported and appropriately taxed.

284. James Alm and Jay Soled, W(h)ither the Tax Gap? 3 (May 31, 2017) (unpublished paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2978215 (claiming that the tax gap will diminish
due to the rise of electronic transactions).
285. Nathan Heller, Imagining a Cashless World, NEW YORKER (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/10/10/imagining-a-cashless-world (describing Sweden’s
nearly complete shift away from cash transactions).
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